Nova Law Review
Volume 19, Issue 1

1994

Article 6

Evidence
Dale Alan Bruschi∗

∗

Copyright c 1994 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr

Bruschi: Evidence

Evidence: 1994 Survey of Florida Law
Dale Alan Bruschi"

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

III.

IV.

V.

INTRODUCTION ...............................
RELEVANCE .................................
A.
CharacterEvidence ........................
B.
Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses ........
EXPERT TESTIMONY ...........................
A. Scientific Evidence ........................
B.
Testimony by Experts .......................
HEARSAY ...................................
A. Statementsfor Purposesof Medical Diagnosis or
Treatment ..............................
B. Business Records ..........................
CONCLUSION ................................

127
128
128
130
131
131
133
134
134
135
138

I. INTRODUCTION
This year's accumulation of evidentiary cases demonstrates some of the
same similarities as in previous years. Criminal evidentiary cases outnumbered civil evidentiary cases almost two to one. Relevance and hearsay
issues alone outnumbered all other evidentiary issues. However, with the
exception of a few cases, there were a scant number of noteworthy cases.
Additionally, few legislative changes in the Florida Evidence Code'
occurred during this survey period.2

* J.D. with honors, Nova University, Shepard Broad Law Center, 1987; B.A.,
University of Florida, 1978; Assistant County Attorney, Broward County, Florida, 1992present; Bruschi, Eng & Koemer, P.A., 1990-1992; Assistant State Attorney, Broward
County, Florida, 1987-1990.
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 90 (1993).
2. Some interesting developments occurred in the last survey period. However, they are
not discussed in full here. Some of the legislative changes in the Florida Evidence Code
during the last survey period included: providing interpreters for deaf jurors, changing the
provisions authorizing the use of closed circuit television and videotaped testimony of child
witnesses, and allowing a limited exemption from the Sunshine Act for a governmental
agency to consult with the agency's attorney to discuss pending litigation.
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II. RELEVANCE

A. CharacterEvidence
The use of character evidence is probably one of the most widely used,
yet misunderstood, sections in the Florida Evidence Code.3 In criminal
cases, the use of similar fact evidence4 to prove other crimes, wrongs, or
acts continues to be the leading area for appellate decisions. Although this
area is a powerful tool for the prosecution of criminal defendants, its
improper usage during trial almost invariably leads to reversed convictions.
During the survey period, numerous similar fact cases-commonly
known as Williams rule5 cases by criminal law practitioners-reached the
appellate courts. Very few broke any new ground in this area. However,
one case does merit discussion. In Williams v. State,6 the Florida Supreme
Court settled an apparent conflict on the issue of whether similar fact
evidence is admissible to rebut a defense of consent in a sexual battery case.
The prevailing case law indicates that consent is unique to the individual,
and therefore, cannot be proven by evidence of other sexual encounters
because the lack of consent of one person is not proof of the lack of consent
of another.7
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of sexual battery, kidnapping,
robbery, and possession of cocaine.' At trial, the state presented the
testimony of two women who stated that the defendant had attacked them
under similar circumstances. 9 The defendant objected that the testimony
was intended to prove his bad character and propensity to assault women
and was, therefore, inadmissible."
The attack on the victim and the attack on the two other women all
occurred in the same general area in Miami. The defendant had engaged all
3. FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (1993).
4. Id. § 90.404(2).
5. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959)
(effectively codified as FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (1993)). The supreme court held that
similar fact evidence is admissible if it is relevant for the purpose of demonstrating something
other than character or propensity. Id. at 663.
6. 621 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1993). Coincidentally, the name "Williams" in the case sub
judice is the same as the famous case wherein the term "Williams rule" originated.
7. See Hodges v. State, 403 So. 2d 1375, 1378-79 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), review
denied, 413 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1982); Helton v. State, 365 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1979).
8. Williams, 621 So. 2d at 413-14.
9. Id. at 414.
10. Id.
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three women in casual conversation regarding purchasing cocaine or having
sex for drugs." With each woman, the defendant followed the same
pattern. The defendant grabbed them with a tight choke hold from behind
and took them to a secluded spot. There, while holding the women by the
neck, he masturbated with one hand prior to raping them. After having
sexual intercourse with the women, he told them not to complain or he
would kill them. He then calmly walked away."
The defendant was apprehended soon after the attack on the victim in
this case. The defendant told the police that he had helped the victim
purchase cocaine and had sex with her in exchange for the drugs. The
defendant explained that the victim became angry when he refused to give
her the drugs."
In analyzing the use of similar fact evidence, the Florida Supreme
Court stated:
Evidence of other crimes or acts may be admissible if, because of its
similarity to the charged crime, it is relevant to prove a material fact in
issue. But it may also be admissible, even if not similar, if it is
probative of a material fact in issue. Although similarity is not a
requirement for admission of other crime evidence, when the fact to be
proven is, for example, identity or common plan or scheme [sic] it is
generally the similarity between the charged offense and the other crime
or act that gives the evidence probative value. Thus, evidence of other
crimes, whether factually similar or dissimilar to the charged crime, is
admissible if the evidence is relevant to prove a matter of consequence
other than bad character or propensity. 4
In the present case, the supreme court concluded that the testimony of
the prior victims was relevant to rebut the defendant's defense that the
present victim had consensual sex with the defendant in exchange for drugs.
The similar fact evidence rebutted the defendant's defense by demonstrating
"a common plan or scheme to seek out and isolate victims likely not to
complain or to complain unsuccessfully because of the circumstances
surrounding the assaults and the victims [sic] involvement with drugs."' 5

11. Id.
12. Id. One of the witnesses stated that she lost consciousness for a moment after the
defendant had grabbed her by the throat. She woke up to find her pants pulled down as the
defendant was confronted by another man. Williams, 621 So. 2d at 414.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citations omitted).
15. Id. at 417.

Published by NSUWorks, 1994

3

Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 6

Nova Law Review

Vol. 19

Since this testimony was relevant to a material fact in issue and its probative
value clearly outweighed any undue prejudice, its admission was permissi6
ble.'
B. Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses
In one of the few cases to arise under section 90.409 of the Florida
Statutes, the First District Court of Appeal examined whether offers of
payment for medical or hospital bills apply to criminal cases. In Johnson
v. State, 7 the defendant arrived at the victim's home in search of several
men. The defendant spotted one of the men, pulled a gun, and gave chase.
During this episode, the victim exited the home and ran outside. As the
defendant fired at a parked car, the bullet ricocheted and struck the victim,
an eleven-year-old boy. 8 The defendant was charged with possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon. 9 Prior to trial, the defense attempted to
exclude testimony by the victim's mother that the defendant had visited the
victim and offered to pay his medical bills. The trial court denied the
objection and the testimony was received into evidence.2"
The district court recognized this case as one of first impression since
section 90.409 of the FloridaStatutes had never been applied to a criminal
case to exclude an offer to pay medical bills. The district court looked to
the Law Revision Council Notes for guidance. The council notes for section
90.409 state that the California Evidence Code has a similar provision which
Florida law has followed.2 The issue of whether California's analogous
provision is applicable in criminal cases was squarely addressed in the
California case of People v. Muniz.22 The court in Muniz indicated that
California's evidence code, like Florida's, only speaks to "liability." The
code does not mention criminal liability. 3
16. Id. The supreme court reiterated its adherence to the findings of the district courts
in Hodges and Helton. It stated that because consent is unique to the individual, evidence
that the victim of an unrelated assault did not consent cannot serve as evidence of nonconsent
by the victim of the charged offense. However, the supreme court did not agree that similar
fact evidence is never relevant to the issue of consent, and disapproved Hodges and Helton
to the extent that they are read in that context. Williams, 621 So. 2d at 415-16.
17. 625 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
18. Id. at 1298.
19. The record does not indicate why the defendant was not charged with numerous
other criminal counts.
20. Johnson, 625 So. 2d at 1298.
21. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.409 Law Revision Council Notes-1976 (West 1988).
22. 262 Cal. Rptr. 743 (4th Ct. App. 1989).
23. See id. at 746.
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Additionally, the council notes indicate that the policy considerations
underlying section 90.408 of the Florida Evidence Code are the same for
section 90.409.24 Furthermore, the exclusion of compromises or offers to
compromise under section 90.408 is based upon two grounds:
(1)The evidence is irrelevant, since "such an offer does not ordinarily
proceed from and imply a belief that the adversary's claim is well
founded, but rather that the further prosecution of the claim, whether
well founded or not, would in any event cause such an annoyance as is
preferably avoided by the payment of the sum offered. (2) The public
policy of this state favors amicable settlement of disputes and the
avoidance of litigation. 25
In criminal cases, the decision to prosecute rests with the state, not the
victim. Therefore, neither of the rationales stated in the council notes apply.
Accordingly, the district court found that the provisions of section 90.409
should be confined to civil cases only and have no application in criminal
cases.

26

III. EXPERT TESTIMONY

A. Scientific Evidence
In Flanagan v. State,27 the Florida Supreme Court adhered to the
Frye28 standard in determining the admissibility of sexual offender
profiles.29 In Flanagan,the defendant was convicted of sexual battery on
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.409 Law Revision Council Notes-1976 (West 1988). This
section concerns compromises and offers to compromise.
25. Johnson, 625 So. 2d at 1299 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.408 Law Revision
Council Notes-1976 (West 1988) (citations omitted)).
26. Id.
27. 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993).
28. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under Frye, in order to
introduce expert testimony regarding a scientific principle, the principle "must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id.
at 1014.
29. The Florida Supreme Court specifically adhered to the Frye standard as the
appropriate test for the admissibility of scientific opinions. The Florida Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the United States Supreme Court's holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993), where the Supreme Court construed Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence as superseding the Frye test. Flanagan,625 So. 2d at 829
n.2; see also Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1989) (rejecting the balancing test of
section 90.403 of the FloridaStatutes for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence
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his nine-year-old daughter. At trial, a psychologist for the prosecution
testified regarding both the common characteristics of the home environment
where child sexual abuse occurs and the characteristics of sexual abusers.3"
The psychologist also examined the nine-year-old girl. The First District
Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, affirmed the conviction but certified
questions to the supreme court regarding whether a child sexual offender
profile is admissible at trial.3' The Florida Supreme Court examined the
academic literature and case law regarding sexual offender profiles and
found that these profiles are not generally accepted in the scientific
community and do not meet the Frye test for admissibility.3 2 Therefore,
under Florida law, sexual offender profiles are inadmissible.
The First District Court of Appeal had also concluded that even if the
sexual offender profile did not meet the Frye test, it was admissible as
background information. 3 The supreme court found this position to be
untenable and stated that "[i]f the evidence was not admitted as substantive
evidence of guilt, then it was irrelevant."34 However, evidence regarding
an expert's credentials or background evidence regarding relevant tests
which the expert conducted is still admissible.35 In this case, the expert's
entire testimony regarding the offender profile had been considered
background information by the district court.36 This was error, albeit
harmless, and beyond the scope of generally admissible background
information.37

and explicitly adopting the Frye test).
30. Flanagan,625 So. 2d at 829. However, evidence of the characteristics of a child
abuser violates rule 90.404(1) which excludes character evidence when it is used to show that
the defendant acted in confonnity with this character trait on a certain occasion. FLA. STAT.
§ 90.404(1) (1993).
31. Flanagan v. State, 586 So. 2d 1085, 1124-25 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (en
banc), affid in part, 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993).
32. Flanagan,625 So. 2d at 829. The prosecution did not demonstrate that the profile
was accepted in the scientific community. The prosecution merely elicited testimony that this
type of information is generally relied on by people working in the field of child sexual abuse
to determine what households may be at risk. The prosecution's own expert testified that the
profile could not be used to prove or disprove that a person is a child abuser. Id.
33. Flanagan,586 So. 2d at 1100.
34. Flanagan,625 So. 2d at 829.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the conviction because the evidence of guilt was
overwhelming and the admission of the sexual offender profile was harmless error based on
the brevity and lack of emphasis placed on this testimony by the prosecution. Id. at 827.
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B. Testimony by Experts
Expert testimony has been utilized in almost every aspect of trial
testimony. The gamut of testimony runs from expert opinions on valuation
of real property3 " to expert opinions on grief and bereavement.39 During
the survey period, the Third District Court of Appeal halted the plethora of
expert opinions and ruled that the grief endured by a family over the loss
of a loved one is within the common understanding of the jury.40 Therefore, expert opinions on grief and bereavement are unnecessary.
In Key v. Angrand,4 the plaintiff utilized an expert to explain the
plaintiff's grief and bereavement over the loss of a loved one. The district
court found that the expert was properly qualified to render an expert
opinion, having a doctorate in sociology and extensive additional education
in the area of grief and bereavement.42 The Florida Evidence Code
specifically states that specialized knowledge may be utilized when it will
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact
in issue.4" However, the expert testimony must concern subjects which are
beyond the common understanding of average persons. In this case, the
district court found that the grief felt at the loss of a loved one is not
beyond the common understanding of the jury. Therefore, the district court
concluded that the expert could add nothing more than what was already in
evidence by the family members and their close friends.
Additionally, expert testimony cannot be used if there is a danger of
unfair prejudice outweighing its probative value." The added cumulative
effect of expert testimony on an area that is easily perceived by the jury
from other lay witnesses tends to give this testimony undue weight. In
essence, the expert testimony bolsters and magnifies the lay witness's

38. City of Gainesville v. Foster, 625 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
39. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct App.), appeal
dismissed, 589 So. 2d 291 (Fla.1991).
40. Key v. Angrand, 630 So. 2d 646, 650 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
41. Id. at 649-50. It just so happens that the expert utilized in Key for grief and
bereavement was the same expert used in Holiday Inns, which was decided by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal. CompareKey, 630 So. 2d at 650 (excluding expert testimony on
the matter of survivor's grief) with Holiday Inns, 576 So. 2d at 336 (allowing use of expert
witness's testimony on the subject of survivor's grief and bereavement).
42. Additionally, the expert had coauthored five books on the subject and numerous
articles and papers.
43. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1993).
44. See La Villarena, Inc. v. Acosta, 597 So. 2d 336, 339 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992);

see also FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1993).
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testimony in a very emotionally charged area. The chance of a prejudicial
effect is much greater when the expert lends his credentials to an already
emotional subject. Therefore, the district court disallowed the use of expert
testimony to explain survivor grief to members of a jury and expressed
direct conflict with the Fourth District's holding in Holiday Inns, which
allows the use of such testimony.

IV. HEARSAY
A. Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosisor Treatment
During the survey period, the Florida Supreme Court explicitly rejected
a liberal interpretation of section 90.803(4) 41 which would allow testimony
by a sexually abused child as to the identity of her abuser.4 6 This expansion of section 90.803(4) would have used the liberal interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence as interpreted in the case of United States v.
Renville.4 7
In State v. Jones,48 the defendant was convicted of sexual battery on
a child less than twelve years old.49 The child testified that the defendant
had sex with her when she was eight years old. Additionally, the testimony
of a doctor was admitted in evidence which indicated that the child had told
the doctor that the defendant had sexual relations with her.50 The district
court of appeal reversed the conviction, finding the doctor's testimony
inadmissible under section 90.803(4) as a statement for medical diagnosis
or treatment. 51 However, the district court of appeal certified conflict with
Flanagan v. State,5" which used a line of federal cases construing the
medical diagnosis exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 3 This line
of federal cases holds that statements of identity by child victims of sexual

45. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(4) (1993).
46. See State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 824-25 (Fla. 1993).
47. 779 F.2d 430, 439 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that child abuse victim's statements to
physician identifying her stepfather as the perpetrator were admissible under the medical
records exception to hearsay rule).
48. 625 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1993).
49. Id. at 821.
50. Id. at 822.
51. Jonesv. State, 600 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, 625 So. 2d 821
(Fla. 1993).
52. 586 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (en banc); see discussion supra part
III.A.
53. Jones, 600 So. 2d at 1140.
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abuse to medical personnel can be pertinent to diagnosis and are admissible
under this exception. 4
The Florida Supreme Court rejected the liberal interpretation used by
the federal courts regarding statements made for medical diagnosis or
treatment. 5 This rejection was based in part on Florida's adoption of
section 90.803(23), the Child Victim Hearsay Exception, which employs
procedural safeguards in the admittance of child victim hearsay.56 The
Florida Supreme Court joined those few jurisdictions that have rejected an
expansion of the medical treatment and diagnosis exception,57 finding the
rationale which underlies the exception unworkable. The reliability and
trustworthiness of statements under this exception should not be distorted by
expanding its rationale to include the identity of an abuser when that
information, in reality, is not reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis.

B. Business Records
An important issue regarding the business records exception was
decided by the Florida Supreme Court during the survey period. In Love v.
Garcia,59 the Florida Supreme Court held that medical records are
admissible under section 90.803(6) of the Florida Evidence Code, through

54. The leading federal case in this area is United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th
Cir. 1985). In Renville, the trial court permitted a physician to testify regarding statements
by an eleven-year-old child identifying her stepfather as her abuser. In examining whether
the child's statements were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, the court stated:
"[F]irst, the declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with the purposes
of promoting treatment; and second, the content of the statement must be such as is
reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or diagnosis." Id. at 436. However, in cases
involving statements by child abuse victims, the Renville court stated that the general
restraints regarding identity should not apply, and stated:
We believe that a statement by a child abuse victim that the abuser is a member
of the victim's immediate household presents a sufficiently different case from
that envisaged by the drafters of rule 803(4) that it should not fall under the
general rule. Statements by a child abuse victim to a physician during an examination that the abuser is a member of the victim's immediate household are
reasonably pertinent to treatment.
Id.
55. Jones, 625 So. 2d at 824-25.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Cassidy v. State, 536 A.2d 666 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 541
A.2d 965 (Md. 1988).
58. Jones, 625 So. 2d at 825.
59. 634 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1994).
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a records custodian, unless the opponent satisfies the burden of showing the
untrustworthy nature of the evidence."
On April 3, 1986, Ms. Garcia was struck by a passing motorist while
trying to cross an intersection.6 At trial, the defense attempted to enter
into evidence the results of Ms. Garcia's two blood alcohol tests as business
records." The plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude the results
based on: 1) the defendant's failure to list witnesses who could testify how
the tests were performed; 2) a lack of information regarding the type of test
conducted; 3) an absence of information regarding who took the samples;
and 4) a lack of evidence demonstrating that the samples were the
plaintiffs.6 3 The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and excluded the
medical reports regarding the plaintiff's blood alcohol level.64
Based on a fifty percent comparative negligence finding, the jury's two
million dollar verdict in favor of the plaintiff was reduced to one million

60. Id. at 160 (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1993)).
61. Id. at 159.
62. Id. The first test indicated a blood alcohol level of .23, almost three times the legal
limit of .08 allowed in Florida drunk driving cases. This test was analyzed by SmithKline,
an outside laboratory. The second test, taken several hours later, was analyzed by the
hospital and demonstrated a blood alcohol level of .14. Id. at 159 n.1.
63. Love, 634 So. 2d at 159. The third and fourth grounds essentially address the proper
chain of custody for the blood test. However, this issue is a red herring. Chain of custody
issues frequently arise in criminal cases and have been settled by the Florida Supreme Court.
An absence of testimony regarding the chain of custody will not exclude relevant evidence
unless there is an indication of probable tampering. Peek v. State, 395 So. 2d 492 (Fla.
1981), cert. denied,451 U.S. 964 (1981); Beck v. State, 405 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Frederiksen v. State, 312 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). These
decisions are equally applicable to civil cases. In any event, the purpose of section 90.803(6)
is to allow a party to introduce relevant records at trial without having to produce all the
persons who had a part in preparing the records. See Southern Bakeries v. Florida
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 545 So. 2d 898, 902 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
Laying an elaborate chain of custody would defeat the purpose of the rule.
64. Love, 634 So. 2d at 159. It is sometimes hard to believe that the fundamental
precept of a trial is a search for the truth. The purpose of an evidence code is to guide the
trial court in excluding unreliable or untrustworthy evidence from the finder of fact. What
could be more enlightening than two blood tests from two different laboratories showing that
the plaintiffs faculties may have been impaired? It would seem that alcohol in a person's
bloodstream at the time of an accident would be relevant and probative on at least two
grounds: 1) the issue of comparative negligence and 2) the ability of the intoxicated person
to accurately relate the events occurring during the period of intoxication. See Edwards v.
State, 548 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 1989) (allowing the testimony regarding the use of intoxicating
substances if it is relevant to the time of the incident, the time of testimony, or the ability of
the witness to observe, remember, or recount).
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dollars."5 The defendant appealed the jury verdict and the Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed, finding the blood tests admissible. However, the
appellate court, sitting en bane, withdrew this decision and affirmed the trial
court's exclusion of the blood tests. 6
The Florida Supreme Court subsequently quashed the district court's
en bane ruling and held that medical records are admissible under the
business records exception of section 90.803(6) if a proper predicate has
been laid.67 Once the proper predicate is laid under section 90.803(6), the
burden shifts to the party opposing the introduction of the records to prove
untrustworthiness of the records. If the opposing party cannot carry this
burden, the records are allowed in evidence as business records. The
trustworthiness of the medical record is presumed if the predicate for the
business record is properly met.6
The supreme court noted that trustworthiness is based on the general
acceptance of the test in the medical field, and the fact that the test is relied
upon in the scientific field involved. 9 Since the entire rationale behind the
business records exception is based on "the reliability of business records
supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce
habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon
them,"7' untrustworthy business records should be the exception rather than
the norm.
The district court's en bane opinion misconstrued the trustworthiness
aspect of the business records exception by basing its decision on whether
the health care providers, administering the tests to the plaintiff in this
particular case, relied on these specific blood tests. The supreme court
noted that "[a]ctual reliance on the test in each course of treatment is not
required."'" The trustworthiness of the test is based on its general
acceptance in the medical field and the fact that the test is relied on in the
general scientific community involved. Blood tests are routinely used and

65. Love, 634 So. 2d at 159.
66. Love v. Garcia, 611 So. 2d 1270, 1277 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (en banc),
quashed by 634 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1994).
67. Love, 634 So. 2d at 159.
68. It goes without saying that if the parties agree that no records custodian is needed
for any business or medical record then the record should be admitted. Once the trustworthiness of the records has been stipulated to, the predicate is presumed. Therefore, if the parties
stipulate that a records custodian is not necessary, then the records are admissible as business
records. Phillips v. Ficarra, 618 So. 2d 312, 314 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
69. Love, 634 So. 2d at 160.
70. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(6) Law Revision Council Notes-1976 (West 1988).
71. Love, 634 So. 2d at 160.
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relied on by hospitals in the normal course of business. Therefore, medical
records containing blood test results should be admissible even if the blood
tests are not relied on in that particular case.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although this year's evidentiary cases were few in number, the Florida
Supreme Court resolved at least some of the more troublesome evidentiary
issues. However, more evidentiary cases will need to be resolved by the
Florida Supreme Court in the coming year. As always, criminal cases
involving similar fact evidence will keep the supreme court's attention.
Additionally, the conflict in the district courts of appeal, regarding expert
testimony on grief and bereavement in personal injury cases, is sure to merit
the supreme court's attention in the upcoming year.
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